The conflict in Syria has been going on for more than four years and is accompanied by mass casualties. Events constantly fall into the spotlight of the world media. There are a huge number of parties involved in the war. Many countries are involved in a crisis.
The conflict in Syria: where did it all start?
The war in the Middle East is still going on. Around the beginning of the conflict in Syria. The reasons are different for each of the current parties. But it all started with anti-government protests. The Baath Party has ruled Syria for more than 70 years. In recent years, Bashar al-Assad has been president. The opposition, inspired in other countries, begins to radically criticize the government and calls on its supporters to take to the streets. In the spring the protests escalated sharply. There are violent clashes between protesters and the police and army. There are constant reports of deaths. A number of northern provinces are practically not controlled by the government. Bashar al-Assad declares that he is ready to seek a compromise and dissolves the cabinet of ministers. But it was already too late.
Social media played an important role. Through Facebook and Twitter, the opposition coordinated its actions and called on people to take actions of disobedience. By the summer, the conflict in Syria is gaining new momentum. Opponents of the government create armed groups, the West supports them and threatens Assad with sanctions if force is used.
Syria: history of the conflict
The clashes take on the character of full-scale hostilities. Rebels unite in A few months after the start of the protests, radical Islamists are actively joining the opposition. Midway through the year, a suicide bomber kills several senior government officials.
In the fall, fighting practically does not stop. The EU and the US actively support the rebels and provide them with technical and material assistance. A number of Western allies are introducing sanctions against Syria. Government troops managed to recapture a number of cities and provide reliable protection for Damascus. The rebels announce plans to attack Aleppo, the second most populous city after the capital. They make several unsuccessful assaults.
International presence
The conflict in Syria is beginning to attract more and more external players. Türkiye officially begins to support the opposition. In the summer of 2012, immediately after announcing their entry into the war, government troops shot down a Turkish plane and opened fire on other targets. Later, artillery hits a column of Turkish vehicles after they cross the border.
Libya and Iran are beginning to support Assad. Armed members of Hezbollah (which can be translated as “Party of Allah”) are arriving in Syria. Together with them, the Syrian army liberates Al-Quseir. In winter, the Assad regime launches a large-scale offensive, which brings significant successes. Against this background, constant terrorist attacks occur in government-controlled cities.
Opposition troops increasingly fit their stereotype in the West. Islamists are joining armed groups. Al-Qaeda is sending a significant contingent to Syria. Cells of this terrorist organization organize training camps.
Relations with Turkey are deteriorating. Several armed clashes occur. The Turkish parliament allows the use of armed forces against Syria, but the war does not start. Some Gulf countries that are allies of the United States provide regular assistance to anti-government forces.
The role of Kurdistan
The conflict in Syria involves many different forces. Kurdistan is a serious player and is often called a "third party." Kurds live in eastern Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Their armed militia is called Peshmerga. This organization was created to protect the territory where ethnic Kurds live. They are loyal to the Assad regime and actively oppose ISIS.
Islamization of the conflict
By 2014, the protracted war was gaining new momentum. The “moderate” opposition plays virtually no role. It is still actively supported by the EU and the US, but in Syria now only the language of weapons is understood. The main fighting is underway. The Jabhat al-Nusra organization controls a significant part of Syria. They are often called terrorists, and information appears in the media that the Islamists are receiving assistance from the United States through the “opposition.”
ISIS is one of the most brutal and largest organizations that has catalyzed the conflict in Syria. The reasons for the success of this organization are still a matter of debate among analysts. The world learned about IS after its militants suddenly captured the large city of Mosul. The Islamists created their own state on the territory under their control. The local population lives strictly according to For example, men are prohibited from cutting their hair. Violations of the rules result in various severe punishments.
One of the important components of IS activities is propaganda. The world community was amazed by a number of videos showing militants executing prisoners. Moreover, the murders occur with sophistication and are filmed by professionals. ISIS is considered an international terrorist organization. A number of NATO countries and Russia are launching attacks on the territories of the Islamic state.
The most common misconception: Russia is involved in the war in Syria because of its geopolitical ambitions. In second place I would put the judgment that in this way Vladimir Putin is distracting international public opinion from the problems in Ukraine.
There are other, equally erroneous expert assessments.
Bashar al-Assad himself, to whom we supposedly have allied obligations, is not the main reason. Emotions sometimes interfere in modern Russian foreign policy, of course, but they are secondary. And even our bases in Latakia and Tartus are a consequence, not a cause at all.
However, before I offer my version of our main global goal, which we are achieving in the Middle East, I will return to those recent events that will help bring us all to the correct logical conclusion.
Correct angle
“Assad is the only legal representative of Syria, just as Poroshenko is of Ukraine. However, Russia supports the former, and fights with the latter on all fronts. Why? Because schizophrenia and hypocrisy are the foundation of Russian foreign policy,” an active Ukrainian blogger pronounces his verdict . In her opinion, there are double standards here.
Another quote: “What about Assad, who controls only a small part of Syrian territory. After all, the last presidential elections, which he won, were held only in this territory. This means that Assad is illegitimate in the rest of the former Syria and therefore has no right to ask for help from Russia to bomb these uncontrolled territories. If Russia knows that he is illegitimate, why does he violate international law and follow the lead of the criminal Assad?” he asks rhetorically (or maybe not rhetorically). .
There is obvious confusion, I don’t know whether it was intentional or out of ignorance. After all, the crisis in Novorossiya, as well as the departure of Crimea, arose before Petro Poroshenko came to power, and not after.
The situation would be mirrored if last year Donbass or, conversely, Galicia armed themselves and went to war against Kiev, occupying regions one after another, as the Syrian opposition did, and Viktor Yanukovych began to defend Ukrainian statehood. Or, on the contrary, there was a forceful seizure of power in Damascus, Bashar Assad would have fled like Yanukovych, and the Syrian regions, not agreeing with the results of the coup in the capital, would have declared their independence from the center.
This is exactly what happened last year in Ukraine: the “revolution of hypocrisy” brought to the surface people whom the Crimea, DPR and LPR did not trust and were even slightly afraid of. Not wanting to have anything in common with the new government, they declared sovereignty.
In response, the center sent an army to Donbass, which often happens after coups. That is, today Russia does not allow the destruction of people living in the previous paradigm - not under Yanukovych, who no longer exists, but also not under Poroshenko, for whom they did not vote.
The Minsk agreements, which Russia insists on implementing first of all, are an attempt to force the new government to talk to people, and not to shoot at them with all guns. It turns out bad. But a bad peace, as we know, is still better than a good war.
In Syria, everything happened exactly the opposite: the local Yanukovych, Bashar Assad, did not surrender the country to be torn to pieces by the Maidan crowd, but began to defend it. And Russia is again on the side of the law - the legitimate president.
It is strange that these obvious analogies and contradictions are not visible to the blinkered eyes of Ukrainian patriots.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the United States supported the unconstitutional change of power in Ukraine. In Syria, on the contrary, there is an armed unconstitutional opposition trying to replace the legitimate government by force. It is Washington, not Moscow, that demonstrates double standards.
Mysterious Putin
However, many Western experts also ignore the obvious. They list an incredible number of reasons that prompted the Russian president to intervene in the Syrian conflict. Among them are the defense of the Assad regime, the replacement of the Ukrainian crisis with the Syrian one, the assertion of Russia as a superpower and an attempt to achieve the lifting of sanctions. But if these assessments can be more or less taken into account, then the lack of logic or impulsiveness of Vladimir Putin as arguments simply speaks of the low level of the experts themselves.
“Putin plays his weak cards exceptionally well because he knows exactly whatwants to achieve. It does not stabilize the situation in our understanding of stability. He defends Russian interests, keeping Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power,” prominent representatives of the American establishment—ex-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and ex-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates—confidently write in The Washington Post.
Their ideas about the world order are especially interesting because they reflect the position of the modern US power elite. The key words here are: “in our understanding of stability.”
The authors do not mention legality at all. Which, of course, indicates a very weak argument. This is all the more strange since the United States is a country that is accustomed to assessing even human actions, not to mention the actions of states, solely on their compliance with the law.
They shy away from precise formulations and references to the UN Charter as the main document establishing legal relations between states and being the foundation of the world order for 70 years. It is more convenient for politicians to talk in terms of faith. “Putin as a defender of international stability? Don’t believe it,” Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates urge.
Of course, they are not the only ones.
Edward Lucas, writer for the Economist, senior vice-president of the Center for European Policy Analysis:Russia won. This is the grim conclusion that Europe's front-line states must draw after a disastrous week for Western diplomacy and American leadership. Russia has begun to operate in Syria. The weapons sent there by Moscow are not an attempt to resolve the conflict. This is a means of protecting the Assad regime, and protecting Assad is the root cause. Putin now seems like a responsible statesman to whom we turn in desperation for help.
Alec Luhn, a freelance journalist writing for Politico:It seems to me that it is worth remembering that Ukraine remains the number one problem for the Kremlin. In the short term, Vladimir Putin's air offensive will help Bashar al-Assad stay in power. But in the long term, the Russian presence in Syria is a bargaining chip. Putin has already ended Russia's diplomatic isolation over Ukraine and scored points by meeting with Obama.
Ben Judah, writer for Politico Europe, author of the book “Fragile Empire: How Russia fell in love and fell out of love with Vladimir Putin”: Vladimir Putin is isolated and acting recklessly, with little regard for the brutal complexities of the Middle East. Crimea, Donbass, Syria - he looks at all this from one point of view. We must put pressure on the weakening West. Kremlin voices are speculating that Vladimir Putin is willing to give up ground on one front in order to advance on another. He could moderate his efforts in Syria in exchange for concessions on Ukraine and the lifting of Western sanctions against Russia.
Masha Gessen, Russian-American journalist, author of the book “The Man Without a Face: The Incredible Rise of Vladimir Putin”: I think Putin's main motive is to establish Russia as a superpower. He uses the old Soviet game plan: force plus blackmail. The main message is this: you will listen to us, you will not exclude us from the conversation. This signal is addressed directly and exclusively to the United States.
Andrew Weiss, vice president of the Carnegie Center, served as director of Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council from 1998 to 2001: People all over the world seriously overestimate Putin, calling him a strategist with a capital S. He is an improviser and an opportunist of the highest order. By all accounts, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine was a disaster. The Syrian adventure bears all the hallmarks of a similar tragedy and tells us a lot about the impulsive and chaotic nature of the Kremlin’s decisions on national security issues.
Mark Galeotti, professor at New York University, expert on Russian security and international organized crime: He [Putin] wants to support and strengthen the Assad regime, or at least give it a break so that it can regroup and so that Moscow has a significant voice in determining the future of the country and the fate of the anti-Assad regime that may emerge. But Syria itself is less important to him. Putin's main goal is broader: to create cracks in the wall of economic and diplomatic isolation built around Russia.
Anders Aslund is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. In 1991 - 1994 was an economic adviser to the Russian government in 1994 - 1997. - under the government of Ukraine: Putin has many goals in this military offensive in Syria. For a whole year he was looking for an opportunity to start a short, victorious war, after his war in Donbass turned out to be neither short nor victorious. He needed a diversion to cover up the failure of the war in eastern Ukraine and then mute it. After much trial and error, Putin settled on Syria.
Keith Gessen, Russian-born writer, journalist, co-editor of n+1 magazine:In keeping with the Russian expression, Putin combines business with pleasure. It feels good to upset poorly thought out American plans. And saving one of the few Russian allies from collapse is useful.
Steven Pifer is director of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution. In 1996 - 1997 was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia at the National Security Council from 1998 to 2000. — US Ambassador to Ukraine: Russia has a long-standing and strong relationship with Damascus, which is one of Moscow's few allies and its main stronghold in the Middle East, and therefore Putin is very reluctant to see the Syrian regime fall. He also seeks to show that Russia is an important player on the world stage, capable of challenging the United States. Apparently, he hopes that the image of a strong Russia playing a leading role in resolving international crises will have a positive effect within the country.
Thomas de Waal, senior fellow at the Carnegie Europe Center:The current Russian regime sees Assad's Syria as its most loyal friend in the Middle East and its own reflection: a secular one-party autocracy that fights internal dissent and Sunni extremism. Active support for Assad reinforces two of Putin's enduring creeds: to vigorously and decisively pursue the "war on terror" (an idea he nurtured even before George W. Bush) and to prevent regime change.
Eugene Rumer, Director of the Russian-Eurasian Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In 2010 - 2014 worked at the National Intelligence Council, focusing on Russia and Eurasia: Putin has been very successful in shifting the conversation away from his aggression in Ukraine—another side benefit of intervening in Syria. He is asserting himself at the expense of the United States, as American officials often complain. Where will Putin go next? He probably doesn't know it himself yet. He will adapt his tactics to the situation as it changes. It is unclear whether there is any strategy behind this.
http://inosmi.ru/russia/20151003/230610202.html#ixzz3nUxoExUP
When Western experts admit their inability to explain the actions of the Kremlin master, this indicates not only the continuation of the information war, but also the beginning of a hot war. When generally accepted rules do not apply, when they expect only cunning from the enemy and, in turn, try to defeat him with cunning methods - ambush regiments, new weapons, or at least numbers.
But in peacetime, laws apply - in this case, the charter and other UN documents. Washington, which for various reasons replaced international law with the law of force, has driven itself into a trap. He took responsibility for the consequences of invading Iraq, for example, without a Security Council resolution—a bloody civil war that cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
NATO and the US are responsible for civil wars not only in Iraq, but also in Libya and Syria. And also for the Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan and the creation of the Islamic State.
What Russia offers
It is quite obvious that the United States, with its idea of exporting democracy, which hides only the establishment of obedient regimes, has fed up with the world. Just as at one time many were tired of the USSR, which tried to spread communism throughout the world by exporting revolutions.
Russia offers a new version of the world order - a world ruled by law. Not justice, which can be interpreted at your own discretion, but rather the law. This is why Putin emphasizes that we are in Syria at the invitation of the legitimate government. That is why Obama’s condition about the inevitable removal of Assad is untenable. Either the Syrians or, at worst, the UN Security Council can decide the fate of the Syrian president.
By the way, this is why Russia is categorically against turning the UN into an amorphous international body in which all the wishes of the United States will be automatically accepted by a majority vote. It still won't work.
Yes, today it is difficult for Moscow and Washington to agree on many issues; every now and then one country or the other uses the right of veto. But this only means that we must continue to negotiate, look for compromises and common interests. As we have seen, if there is only one hegemon in the world, sooner or later he ceases to be a beacon of goodness and justice.
In the proposed configuration, there are two poles of power: on one, American preferences operate, on the other, international law, which protects weak countries from the tyranny of the strong.
A missile strike from the Caspian Sea demonstrated that the second pole had taken shape. Russia very effectively made an offer that is now difficult to refuse.
Illustration copyright AFP Image caption Government forces in Syria have recently achieved notable military successes with the support of Russian aviation
In recent days, the troops of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have been conducting a large-scale offensive against the city of Aleppo, located in the north of the country and one of the key cities controlled by the opposition.
The government army, which until recently was considered demoralized and little capable of fighting, is making good progress, taking many in the West by surprise.
The offensive against Aleppo is being carried out with strong air support. Russian aviation regularly attacks Syrian opposition units.
By agreement with the Syrian leadership, Rasmus Tantholdt, a correspondent for the Danish TV channel TV2, is staying with Bashar al-Assad’s troops in the Aleppo area, claiming that among the many groups fighting as part of the government forces, he saw the Russian military.
Story by Rasmus Tantholdt, correspondent for the Danish TV channel TV2:
I was surprised by how many different groups are fighting on the side of Bashar al-Assad, next to the fighters of the Syrian army. We saw people from the so-called Al-Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia from Iraq. We saw Hezbollah militants, we saw soldiers from Iran, fighters from the Lebanese Amal movement, we also saw Russian soldiers.
I imagined that the Russian military was mainly above us, in the sky, but we also saw them on the ground. It was near Raqqa, the so-called capital of the so-called Islamic State. We saw them on the road leading from Damascus to Aleppo.
At some point you need to turn left there, because if you turn right, you will go to Raqqa, which we ourselves, of course, did not want. And we saw the Russian military heading towards Raqqa. I don’t know how close they eventually got to it, maybe they have a small base there, I don’t know. But they were quite close to Raqqa, about 50 kilometers away.
Specifically, I saw one armored personnel carrier. I've seen armored vehicles like this before and checked them out after that. It was a Russian armored personnel carrier. I didn't talk to the soldiers, and we're not allowed to film them, so I don't know if they spoke Russian, but they were wearing Russian uniforms and sitting on a Russian armored personnel carrier.
The armored personnel carrier drove by very quickly, I did not have time to see the insignia, but when I asked the Syrian officers if they were sure that they were Russians, they replied: “Of course, they are Russians.”
Illustration copyright Reuters Image caption Much of Aleppo city destroyed by massive bombingComment by Sir Tony Brenton, former British Ambassador to Russia:
I'm surprised that he (Rasmus Tantholdt) thinks he saw Russian ground troops. The Russians have said they have no ground troops in Syria. Large losses there would result in significant problems at home.
But as for the rest, there is a real proxy war going on there with significant participation of Iranians, Syrians and others. Here he paints a very true picture.
I was in the same room with Vladimir Putin when he spoke about the dangers of Islamic extremism. And this is the main thing that drives him at the moment.
They (the Russians) believe that the West is incompetent, if not hostile, in its actions against Islamic extremism, and point to what has happened in Iraq and Libya in particular. They intend to avoid a similar outcome in Syria.
And they firmly believe that the only way to defeat Islamic extremism in Syria is to strengthen the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This is what they obviously do.
They really want, in the end, I think, to move on to close cooperation with the West in order to find a regime that will be friendly to them, and not necessarily with the participation of Assad personally.
But they are determined to strengthen Assad's position as soon as possible before the truce, which comes into effect at the end of the week. And they are quite clearly, I think, intent on taking control of Aleppo in order to ensure that Assad does not fall in the near future.
They've done this before. If we remember the events in Ukraine in February last year and the second Minsk agreement, they demanded that it come into force after some time, and they used this time to take Debaltsevo and strengthen the position of their supporters.
Russia, in general, is committed to the idea of this truce [in Syria - approx. ed.]. Nobody believes that this truce will really come. But Russia really wants cooperation with the West to prevent the Islamic State from taking over Syria.
The point is to make this cooperation work, despite the mutual mistrust that exists due to the very different approaches of the West and Russia to this situation.
There are many versions and hypotheses regarding the reasons for the start of the Syrian campaign and the real tasks assigned to the Russian Aerospace Forces.
The official position of the authorities is to fight terrorism at distant approaches. One of the points of view spread on the Internet is the protection of Gazprom’s interests in the form of preventing the construction of the “Qatar pipe”. However, both of these versions raise one important question: why did the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria begin only in the fall of 2015, and not a year or two earlier?
The war in Syria began back in 2011 and by 2013 had assumed such proportions that there was a serious threat to both the power of Bashar al-Assad and the integrity of the country. ISIS also arose quite a long time ago and the terrorist nature of the organization became obvious almost immediately.
It is no secret that any threat should be dealt with as early as possible, before it assumes alarming proportions. Therefore, if the Kremlin were really most concerned about the threat of the spread of terrorism from the Middle East to Russian territory, then it should have joined the fight and provided assistance to Bashar Assad starting in 2012-2013.
The same applies to the version about the “Qatari pipe”. The real threat of the military defeat of Bashar al-Assad and a change of power in Syria arose back in 2013 - then it was necessary to get involved if the main task was to prevent the “Qatar flow”.
In addition, the version about the “Qatar pipe” is absurd purely economically. In the short term, the Qatari pipeline does not pose any threat to Gazprom, because the construction of a pipeline is not a quick process. Until the war ends (which has no end in sight), until the pipe is built, years will pass. This is not even a couple of years, but five or six years, no less. Or even all ten.
As for the long term, the preservation of Bashar al-Assad’s power does not provide any guarantee that the Qatari pipeline will not arise in the future. Firstly, Bashar Assad is not eternal; he will be removed sooner or later anyway. Secondly, Syria will need money for reconstruction, so the Syrians themselves will be interested in building the Qatari pipeline - with or without Assad.
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces does not solve the problem of the possible emergence of a “Qatar pipe” in the long term. But in the short term, such a problem simply does not exist. Therefore, the version about the “Qatar pipe” is absurd and is caused by the technical and economic illiteracy of its supporters, suffering from gas industry centrism in an advanced stage.
The official version about the fight against terrorism on distant approaches, as shown above, also raises some questions due to the late start of the operation.
Of course, the threat of destabilization of the Caucasus in the event of ISIS victory in Syria existed, but this threat arose long before 2015.
Why did the Russian Aerospace Forces operation begin at the end of 2015, and not earlier?
Maybe they used to think that Bashar Assad could cope on his own?
Hardly. For some reason, I can’t believe such naivety of Russian strategists. Back in 2013, Bashar al-Assad’s situation became extremely complicated and the Syrian authorities lost control over a significant territory, including part of Damascus. To think that Bashar Assad would get out of this situation on his own was simply stupid. Moreover, the Kremlin and the General Staff understood perfectly well who was behind the Syrian opposition and ISIS.
Back in 2013, it became clear that things were heading towards the destruction of the Bashar Assad regime, and without external help this would become completely inevitable.
Then why did the Russian Aerospace Forces operation begin only at the end of 2015?
Maybe it took time to prepare?
Preparing a large military operation is a serious matter. But military science consists of conducting preparations for military operations not only seriously, but also quite quickly. If you spend two years planning operations, you will never be able to carry them out - in two years the situation will change so much that you will have to prepare all over again.
The preparation of an operation by the Russian Aerospace Forces could take several months, maybe six months, but not two.
Maybe it's about Bashar al-Assad, who did not want to ask Russia for military assistance earlier? Also unlikely. Bashar al-Assad’s situation became so complicated back in 2013 that if Russia had offered him an option with the participation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, he would have agreed even then.
It turns out there is an inexplicable delay in the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation - a delay of about a year and a half.
This delay has no explanation within the framework of the official version of the fight against terrorism at distant approaches. And within the framework of the “Qatar pipe” version, too, which is very typical.
But if we put the official version (and at the same time the version about the “fight against the Qatari pipeline”) aside and start from the time the operation began, trying to understand its reasons based on the chronology of events, everything becomes much more clear both in terms of time and goals.
Let's remember what important events preceded the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria:
March 2014 - return of Crimea.
May 2014 - Burkhalter's visit, the beginning of the war in Donbass.
September 2014 - signing of the first Minsk agreements.
December 2014 - the South Stream project was stopped, oil prices fell, the ruble collapsed.
February 2015 - signing of the second Minsk agreements.
May 2015 - decree on classifying losses.
At the same time, starting in mid-2014, Western sanctions began to be introduced and gradually expanded, as well as attempts by the Kremlin to develop retaliatory measures and motivate the West to lift sanctions.
It would seem, what does Syria have to do with it?
Here's what it has to do with it:
Until April 2014, everything was, figuratively speaking, chocolate for the Kremlin. They held “the best Olympics in history”, triumphantly returned Crimea, the construction of South Stream was in full swing, after the completion of which (planned for 2015) the dependence on the Ukrainian gas transportation system, with all that it entails, would be sharply reduced. And oil prices were high, which made it possible to look confidently into the future and make optimistic plans for further “rising from our knees.”
Until the spring of 2014, the Kremlin was not too concerned about the state of affairs in Syria and the position of Bashar al-Assad. True, Putin in 2013 helped Assad get rid of chemical weapons and thereby deprived the United States of a convenient excuse to throw tomahawks at Damascus, but at that moment the Kremlin considered its mission completed and did not plan any participation in the Syrian war.
Please note that no one in 2014 frightened Russian television viewers with stories about terrible, terrible terrorists from ISIS who dream of getting to Russia and with whom they need to start fighting at distant approaches. Although ISIS and terrorists already existed at that time. But for the Russian TV viewer at that time there was a different, more juicy picture - the terrible terrible Ukrainian Banderaites and Right Sector activists who staged the Maidan and were going to fight with Russia. The Banredites and the Right Sectorists were both closer (right at the Russian border) and more understandable in their hatred of Russia and Russians.
By defending Crimea from Bandera’s Right Sector supporters, the Kremlin earned itself the image of a savior and protector in the eyes of the Russian audience and confidently exploited this image, promising to protect Donbass if anyone dares to commit outrages there.
Until a certain moment, the Kremlin thought that this would be the case - they would attack the Ukrainian punitive forces in the south-east of Ukraine and everything would end in the best possible way. It is difficult to say how they planned to end the matter - the creation of Novorossiya or a change of power in Kiev, but one thing is clear - back in April the Kremlin believed that events in Ukraine would develop under their dictation.
Beginning in May 2014, the Kremlin’s plans quickly fell apart.
It all started with a visit to Moscow by Burkhalter, who presented such compelling arguments and arguments that the Kremlin was immediately forced to abandon Novorossiya and Donbass.
After this, the format of the Normandy Four emerged, within which the partners clearly explained to the Kremlin that in order to maintain relations it was necessary to recognize the results of the elections in Ukraine (that is, Poroshenko), which Putin did.
Then there was the incident with the downed Boeing.
The imposition of sanctions has begun.
The result of the entire chain of events from Burkhalter’s visit to the downing of the Boeing and sanctions was the signing of the first Minsk agreements and the official announcement that Donbass is part of Ukraine.
The year, which began with great victories and reputational gains (the Olympics, Crimea) ended with heavy blows to the reputation, and the Kremlin’s reputation suffered both within the country and in the international arena.
In the eyes of the Russian public, the Kremlin began to turn from a protector and savior into a traitor and defeatist. In the eyes of the world community, the Kremlin was turning into an aggressor and violator of international laws.
Reputational losses within the country meant that winning the next elections became extremely difficult. Reputational losses in the international arena led to isolation and sanctions, which meant a decrease in income and, as a consequence, a deterioration in the economic situation, which again created difficulties for winning the next elections.
One of the consequences was the termination of the South Stream project, on which the Kremlin had high hopes. Stopping this project can be seen as a type of sanctions imposed by the West after the Ukrainian events.
At the end of 2014, after the fall in oil prices and the resulting collapse of the ruble, the Kremlin’s position became even more complicated.
This was followed by the signing of the second Minsk agreements, which, on the one hand, once again confirmed the Kremlin’s refusal from Donbass, and on the other hand, the new agreements specified a deadline for their implementation - until the end of 2015.
After this, the Kremlin, apparently, began to look for a way to get out of the current situation in order to restore its reputation, switch the attention of the Russian audience from the failure in Donbass to something successful and victorious, and at the same time regain its position in world politics - to prove that Russia is not an aggressor and a violator of international laws, but rather a defender of world order, stability, integrity, a fighter against terrorism, and so on and so forth.
Then, apparently, a decision was made to take part in the Syrian war in order to earn a reputation as a fighter against international terrorism as a universally recognized evil, to protect the integrity of Syria and to show the Russian audience how Russia can kill an adversary while protecting the safety of its citizens.
Please note that in May 2015, a presidential decree was issued to classify losses - this was clearly one of the stages of preparation for the Syrian campaign, which began at that time.
Preparations for the Syrian operation probably began in April-May 2015.
This is fully consistent with both the start of the campaign in September (preparation took about 5 months, which is quite plausible) and with previous events.
After sanctions, the termination of South Stream, the fall in oil prices and the collapse of the ruble at the end of 2014, it became obvious to the Kremlin that it urgently needed to restore its reputation, otherwise it would be impossible to either get rid of sanctions or survive the next elections in the country.
After the signing of the second Minsk agreements, the Kremlin needed something that could distract the attention of the Russian audience at the end of 2015, when the implementation deadline approached, and then throughout 2016, in order to show less of what was happening in the Donbass.
A strong distraction was needed both in case the Minsk agreements were implemented at the end of 2015 and during 2016, and in case the sluggish war in Donbass continued with incessant shelling of populated areas.
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria became such a distracting factor.
The real goals and objectives of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation can be formulated as follows:
1. Switch the attention of the Russian audience from Donbass to Syria, from the terrible Bandera and Right Sector activists to the even more terrible ISIS terrorists.
2. Show the Russian audience how troops, on the orders of the commander-in-chief, effectively protect the peace and tranquility of Russian citizens on distant approaches - so that citizens do not think that Putin could not protect some “wrong Russians” in the Donbass (who held the wrong referendum), but that Putin can and does protect them from Islamist terrorists who threaten the personal safety of Russian citizens.
3. To arouse in the Russian audience a sense of pride in the Russian army and the commander-in-chief personally, showing what a modern and effective army is in Russia, what cruise missiles, bombers, space forces it has, a control center with a screen of one hundred hundred square meters, and so on.
4. Show the world community that Russia acts legally (see the Syrian President’s appeal for military assistance) and fights threats to international security (terrorism), and does so even more effectively than the United States, because the United States for many years could not do anything about ISIS , and Russia got down to business - and here is the result. Show that Russia protects and saves world values (see the liberation of Palmyra with its historical relics), fights to preserve the integrity of Syria, and also helps stop the flow of refugees to Europe caused by this very war.
5. Ensure that the West maintains a dialogue with Russia and negotiates more actively, because without Russia it is impossible to solve world problems, in particular achieving stability in the Middle East.
The goals and objectives of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria can be described as reputational.
1) Restoring the reputation that suffered within the country after the surrender of Donbass.
2) Restoring reputation that suffered outside the country after the annexation of Crimea.
The task that the Kremlin is solving in Syria is to prove to both Russian and global audiences that it is good, correct, fighting for security, stability, integrity, acting legally, protecting the people, and so on.
At the same time, the Kremlin is forcing the West to engage in dialogue and improve relations with Russia, which, as planned, should lead to the gradual lifting of sanctions and recognition of Crimea, even if only tacitly.
It is this set of goals and objectives that is important and fundamental enough for the Kremlin to take such a risky step as participating in the Middle East war.
The Kremlin is solving problems in Syria related to maintaining power and getting out of sanctions - these are much larger tasks than the problem of a single pipe, which, moreover, will not appear very soon. The Kremlin solves problems on which not part of Gazprom’s income depends, but all of Gazprom, all of Rosneft and all other sources of income combined.
In Syria, the Kremlin is solving the problems of maintaining power and restoring relations with the West, with all the ensuing gas flows to Europe, lifting sanctions and maintaining control over the Russian economy along with Gazprom, Rosneft and other corporations.
That is why the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria began precisely at the end of 2015 - no earlier and no later.
It didn’t make sense for the Kremlin to start it in 2014, because in 2014 the tasks listed above had not yet arisen - the price of oil was still high, sanctions were considered a temporary phenomenon, and the president lit the candle for Novorossiya only in the fall.
The listed tasks became relevant at the beginning of 2015, but it took time to make a decision and work through the operation, so the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces began only in September. And the deadline for the implementation of the Minsk agreements was set at the end of 2015, so it was then that the Kremlin needed to more actively shift the audience’s attention from Donbass to Syria, maintain its reputation and persuade the West to dialogue and take into account its interests.
The listed tasks explain not only the start date, but also the features of the operation with demonstration calibration throwing, a concert in Palmyra and other external effects.
And the protracted nature of the operation is also fully explained by the goals indicated above.
If you believe the reports of the Ministry of Defense, then during the operation several times more terrorists were killed than there were initially in ISIS. And three times more were put to flight. The number of bombs dropped is almost greater than the number of terrorists killed - with this number it was possible to destroy half of the Wehrmacht, not to mention ISIS bases and command posts.
The duration of the operation, the variety of means used and the abundance of spent ammunition are the result of the fact that during the operation mainly reputational and image problems were solved, that is, the operation is primarily indicative.
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria is a demonstration war.
A war whose main task is to show it on TV.
